In the binary online (or "causal") channel coding model, a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1} n bit by bit via a channel limited to at most pn corruptions. The channel is "online" in the sense that at the ith step of communication the channel decides whether to corrupt the ith bit or not based on its view so far, i.e., its decision depends only on the transmitted bits (x1, . . . , xi). This is in contrast to the classical adversarial channel in which the error is chosen by a channel that has full knowledge of the transmitted codeword x.
INTRODUCTION
Reliable communication over different types of channels has been extensively studied in electrical engineering and computer science. One frequently used communication channel model is the binary erasure channel, in which a bit (a zero or one) is either transmitted intact or erased. Specifically, an erased bit is a visible error, denoted by a special symbol Λ, which can be identified directly by a receiver. Another frequently studied channel model is the binary bit-flip channel, where bits can be flipped to their complement.
There are two broad approaches to model (erasure or bitflip) errors imposed by the binary channel. Shannon's approach is to model the channel as a stochastic process; Hamming's approach is a combinatorial approach to model the channel by an adversarial process that can erase or flip parts of the transmitted codeword arbitrarily, subject only to a limit on the number of corrupted bits.
It is interesting to further classify the Hamming model for an adversarial binary channel in terms of the adversary's knowledge of the codeword. Some examples include the standard adversarial channel (also referred to here as the omniscient adversary), e.g., [10, 19, 17] , the causal (or online) adversary, e.g., [6, 14, 12, 8, 2] , and the oblivious adversary, e.g., [15, 13, 11] ; from the strongest adversarial power to weakest. In one extreme, the omniscient adversarial model (a.k.a. the classical adversarial model) assumes that the channel has full knowledge of the entire codeword, and based on this knowledge, the channel can maliciously choose the error pattern. In the other extreme, the oblivious adversarial model is a model in which the channel is clueless about the codeword and generates errors in a manner that is independent of the codeword being transmitted. The causal adversarial model is an intermediate model between the two extremes, in which the channel decides whether to tamper with a particular bit of the codeword based only on the bits transmitted so far. There are significant differences between the different adversarial models classified above (with respect to their capacity). We elaborate on these differences shortly.
In this work we focus on causal adversaries, and study reliable communication over binary causal adversarial erasure channels and binary causal adversarial bit-flip channels. Specifically, we consider the following communication scenario. A sender (Alice) wishes to transmit a message m ∈ U to a receiver (Bob) over a binary causal adversarial channel by encoding m into a codeword x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ {0, 1} n of length n. However, the channel is governed by a causal adversary (Calvin), who can observe x and manipulate up to a p-fraction of the n transmitted bits. More importantly, Calvin decides whether to tamper with the i-th bit of the codeword based only on the bits (x1, x2, · · · , xi) transmitted thus far. Our goal is to find a coding scheme by which Alice can send as many distinct messages as possible while ensuring Bob succeeds in decoding w.h.p. Roughly, if 2 nR distinct messages can be sent using codewords of length n, we say that a code achieves rate R. We are interested in the maximum achievable rate R, which is the capacity Cp of the channel. (See Section 2 for precise definitions.)
Our Results
In this work we characterize the capacity of both the binary causal bit-flip channel and the binary causal erasure channel as a function of p (the strength of the adversary).
Specifically, we propose and analyze a coding scheme which implies a lower bound on the capacity for both channels that matches the known upper bounds [8, 2] (to be described in detail shortly). Our main results can be summarized by the following two Theorems. .
Theorem 1.2. The capacity of the binary causal adversary erasure channel is
In fact, as direct by-products of the analysis of our coding scheme, we can show that even if Calvin has "small" lookahead, the capacity is essentially unchanged. More precisely, if for any constant > 0, Calvin decides whether to tamper with the i-th bit of the codeword based only on the bits (x1, x2, · · · , xj), where j = min{n, i + n }, then the capacity of the corresponding "n -lookahead is at most f ( ) less than the corresponding C f lip and C erase we show in Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 above (for some continuous f ). We provide a rough argument in support of this claim in the Remark at the end of Section 3.
Previous Work
We start by briefly summarizing the state-of-the-art for erasure and bit-flip adversarial channels, for both omniscient and oblivious adversaries. The optimal rate of communication over binary omniscient adversarial channels (for both erasure and bit-flip errors) are long standing open problems in coding theory. The best known lower bounds for the problems derive from the Gilbert-Varshamov codes (the GV bound) [10, 19] , and the tightest upper bounds (the MRRW bounds) from the work by McEliece et al. [17] .
The literature on Arbitrarily Varying Channels (AVCs, e.g., [15] ) implies that the capacity of the binary oblivious adversarial bit-flip channel is 1 − H(p), and that of oblivious adversarial erasure channels is 1 − p; these match the well-known capacities of the corresponding "random noise" channels with bits flipped or erased Bernoulli(p), but are attainable even for noise patterns that can be chosen (up to an overall constraint of a p-fraction corruptions) by an adversary with full knowledge of the codebook, but no knowledge of the actually transmitted codeword. 1 An alternate proof of the capacity of the binary oblivious bit-flip channel was presented in [13] by Langberg, and a computationally efficient scheme achieving this rate was presented in [11] by Guruswami and Smith.
We now turn to the causal setting. As a causal adversary can never do better than an omniscient adversary and does at least as well as an oblivious one, the upper bounds on capacity for oblivious adversaries specified above act as upper bounds for the causal case as well; and the lower bounds on capacity for omniscient adversaries act as lower bounds for the causal case. For the binary causal adversarial bitflip channel both bounds were improved. Specifically, the first nontrivial upper bound min 1 − H(p), (1 − 4p)
+ -essentially, the minimum of the binary entropy function and the Plotkin bound [18] -was given by Langberg et al. [14] . Later, the tightest upper bound was given by the continuing work of Dey et al. [8, 9] and is equal to C f lip p of Theorem 1.1. The best lower bound previously known for the binary causal adversarial bit-flip channel was described by Haviv and Langberg [12] which slightly improves over the GV bound. For the binary causal adversarial erasure channel the trivial upper bound of 1 − p was improved to 1 − 2p (which we demonstrate equals C erase p in Theorem 1.2) by Bassily and Smith [2] , who also presented improved lower bounds that separate rates achievable against causal adversarial erasures from the rates achievable against omniscient adversarial erasures for a range of p.
Related results include the study of binary delayed adversaries by Dey et al. [7] who provide a characterization of the capacity in the case of "delays" d which are an arbitrarily small (but constant) fraction of the code block length n.
2 The value d here corresponds to an adversarial model in which the decision of whether or not to corrupt the ith codeword bit depends only on (x1, . . . , x i−d ) (and the overall constraint on the number of bits that can be corrupted). It is interesting to note that, in this case as well as the oblivious one, the capacity of the bit-flip and bit-erasure channels matches the corresponding random noise capacities (of 1 − H(p) and 1 − p). On the other hand, as mentioned, the causal and n lookahead settings have strictly lower, but approximately matching, capacities. This seems to imply that the knowledge of the present is critical for Calvin to significantly depress the capacity below the random noise capacity. 1 In fact, it can even be shown that if Alice is allowed to use stochastic encoding -choosing one of multiple possible codewords randomly for each message she wants to transmit -then even for a maximal probability of error metric, a vanishingly small probability of error can be attained by capacity achieving codes. That is, there exists a sequence of codes whose rates asymptotically achieve the corresponding capacity, and such that for every message transmitted by Alice and for every corruption pattern imposed by Calvin, Bob can decode correctly for "most" codewords corresponding to that message. 2 While not presented in that work, the techniques of [7] can be used to show that the same capacity holds even if the delay is polylog(n) rather than d = O(n). While the above discussion relates to the problem of binary alphabets, the work of Dey et al. [6] considered "large alphabet channels" (in which the alphabet size is "significantly larger" than the block-length n) with causal symbol errors.
3 A complete capacity characterization was presented (with corresponding computationally efficient codes attaining capacity), which demonstrated that the capacity of this problem equals 1 − 2p, which is the same as the capacity of an omniscient adversary (attained by Reed-Solomon codes, and impossibility of higher rates by the Singleton bound). This demonstrates that the penalty imposed on Calvin by the causality requirement diminishes with increasing alphabet size.
Also related to this work is the study of Mazumdar [16] in which the capacity of memoryless channels where the adversary makes his decisions based only on the value of the currently transmitted bit is addressed. We note that the causal model is also a variant of the AVC model [3, 15] , however previous works on AVCs with capacity characterizations do not relate directly to the study at hand on causal adversaries.
Proof Technique
In this work we presents a coding scheme for both binary causal adversarial bit-flip and erasure channels that achieves rates that match the known upper bounds (respectively [8, 9] and [2] ) from previous studies, and as such is optimal. Our coding scheme is an existential one, and is based on stochastic encoders. Specifically, in our codes the encoder Alice uses internal randomness (not known to the receiver Bob or the adversary Calvin) in the choice of the transmitted codeword. The internal randomness is designed to allow a high probability of successful communication no matter which message Alice is sending to Bob.
In both the erasure and bit-flip channels, the codes we use are random codes. Namely, we pick our codes uniformly at random from all possible codes of a specific rate, and prove using probabilistic tools, e.g., [1] , that w.h.p. over the code distribution a code chosen at random allows reliable communication over our channels. The decoder used in both the erasure and bit-flip case involves two major phases: a list decoding phase in which the decoder obtains a short list of messages that includes the one transmitted; and a unique decoding phase in which the list is reduced to a single message. Roughly, Bob in his decoding process divides the received word into two parts -all bits received up to a given time t , and all bits received afterwards. The list decoding is done using the first part of the received word, and the process of unique decoding from the list is done using the second part. Both the list decoding and the unique decoding phase are done by considering the family of codewords of a certain given distance from the (first or second part of the) received word.
In the erasure case, given the parameter p (that specifies the fraction of bits that can be erased by the adversary) and the received word, the decoder Bob can pin-point the value of t that will allow successful decoding. Specifically, for any adversarial behavior, we show the existence of a value t that satisfies two special properties: the list decoding condition that allows Bob to obtain a small list of messages from the first part of the received word; and the energy bounding condition which guarantees that the fraction of bits erased by the adversary in the second part of the received word cannot suffice to confuse Bob between any two messages in the list he holds. The ability to list decode is obtained using standard probabilistic arguments that take into account the block length t and the fraction of erasures pt in the first part of the received word. The ability to uniquely decode from the obtained list involves a more delicate analysis which uses the stochastic nature of our encoding and the causality constraint of Calvin. In particular, we use the fact that the secret bits used in the encoding of the first part of the codeword (up to position t ) are independent of those used for the second part. This independence is useful in separating the two decoding phases in the sense that the casual adversary at time t is acting with no knowledge whatsoever on the secret bits used by Alice after time t . This lack of knowledge sets the stage for the unique decoding phase.
We accommodate different potential values of t by designing a stochastic encoding process in which different parts of the codewords rely on independent secret bits of Alice. Namely, we divide the encoding process into chunks. Each chunk is a random stochastic code of length nθ for a small parameter θ that uses independent randomness from Alice. The final code of Alice is a concatenation of all its chunks. Setting θ small enough allows enough flexibility to manage any possible value t chosen by Bob's decoder.
The encoding and decoding process for the bit-flip channel follow the same line of analysis as specified above for the erasure case, but with one major and significant difference. Bob does not know which bits in the transmitted codeword were flipped, and thus by studying the received word, Bob is not able to identify a location t that satisfies the list decoding and energy bounding conditions. To overcome this difficulty, we design an iterative decoding process in which Bob starts with a small value of t and attempts to decode. As before the decoding process first list decodes using the first part of the received word and then uniquely decodes. The list decoding is done according to a certain "guessed" valuept for the fraction of bit flips in the first part of the received word. Here,pt is a carefully designed function of t (also referred to as a "trajectory") that is fixed and known to all parties involved in the communication. We show that if Bob guessed correctly, i.e., if the fractionpt is equal to the actual fraction of bits pt flipped in the first part of the received word, then the decoding will successfully return the correct message. Otherwise, we show that the unique decoding phase will fail in the sense that Bob will not receive any message from the decoding process. Identifying a failure in the decoding process, Bob increases t and repeats the decoding attempt. The crux of our analysis lies in our proof that eventually, no matter what the behavior of Calvin is, there will be a value of t, denoted t , for whichpt is approximately pt and the decoding succeeds. Establishing the existence of the trajectorypt, and proving that at some point it must be close to pt is a central part of our proof.
Structure
In the remaining part of this extended abstract we focus on our proof for the bit-flip case, i.e., Theorem 1.1, as it includes the ideas needed for the simpler proof of Theorem 1.2. The proof of Theorem 1.2 appears in detail in [5] . In Section 2 we formally present the channel model, the encoder, and the decoding process. In addition, we present a careful description of the adversarial behavior. Section 3 then presents an overview of our code analysis and the proof of Theorem 1.1 (our main result for the bit-flip channel). Due to space limitations, all the technical claims for the bit-flip channel and their proofs appear in the extended version [5] . Similarly, all discussions pertaining to the (simpler) bit-erasure model are also not presented here, and we refer the interested reader to [5] .
MODEL
Channel Model. 
Random code distribution.
We now define a distribution over codes. In our proof, we use this distribution to claim the existence of a fixed code that allows reliable communication between Alice and Bob over the channel model. In our code construction R denotes the code rate, S the private secret rate of the encoder (to be defined explicitly shortly), and θ a "quantization" parameter (specified below).
Let U = [2 nR ] denote Alice's message set and S = [2 nS ] be the set of private random secrets available only to Alice. The encoder randomness S is neither shared with the receiver nor the adversary. Let Φ be the uniform distribution over stochastic codes U × S → X nθ . Let C1, C2, · · · , C 1 θ be stochastic codes, which are i.i.d. according to the probability distribution Φ. Specifically, ∀i ∈ 1 θ , the corresponding stochastic code is a map Ci : U × S → X nθ chosen from the distribution Φ.
Encoder.
Given a message m ∈ U and 
where Ci(m, si) is the i-th sub-codeword in the entire codeword, and • denotes the concatenation between two chunks of sub-codewords. To distinguish the concatenated code C from the code for a chunk, we will call C1, C2, · · · , C 1 θ subcodes hereafter. Our analysis then focuses on two mega subcodes, defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. Let a code C of block-length n consist of 1 θ sub-codes. Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n − nθ} and t ∈ T . A left mega sub-code of C with respect to t is the concatenation of the first t nθ sub-codes of C. Definition 2.2. Let a code C of block-length n consist of 1 θ sub-codes. Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n − nθ} and t ∈ T . A right mega sub-code of C with respect to t is the concatenation of the last
In our analysis, it is convenient to describe the encoding scheme of Alice in a causal manner. Namely, we will assume that the secret value si corresponding to the encoding of the i-th chunk is chosen by Alice immediately before the i-th chunk is to be transmitted and no sooner.
As mentioned above, we show that with positive probability, the code C chosen at random based on the distribution above has certain properties that allow reliable communication over our channel model.
Decoding process.
The decoding process of Bob is done in an iterative manner. Specifically, upon receiving the entire codeword with bit-flips, Bob identifies the smallest value of t ≥ (1 − 4p)n corresponding to the (end) location of a chunk, and attempts to correctly decode the transmitted message m based on the left and right mega sub-codeword with respect to position t. The decoding process is terminated if a message is decoded by Bob, otherwise the value of t is increased by θn (the chunk size) and Bob attempts to decode again. This process continues until t reaches the end of the codeword. If no decoding succeeds until then, a decoder error is declared.
Each attempt of decoding can be divided into two phases. First, at each position t, Bob chooses an estimatept (to be specified shortly) for the fraction of bit-flips used by Calvin in the left mega sub-codeword with respect to position t. In our proof to come, we show thatpt satisfies two important conditions, the list-decoding condition and the energy bounding condition (see Claim 3.2). The list-decoding condition allows Bob to decode the left mega sub-codeword
through a list decoder with list size L. As we will show, the list L consists of at most O 1 messages. Here, and in what follows, > 0 is a constant design parameter that can be considered to be arbitrarily small. So at this phase Bob obtains a list L of L messages. If it is the case thatpt equals the true fraction of bits pt flipped by the adversary up to position t, then it holds that the transmitted message is in L.
Next, for the second phase, the energy bounding condition states that, ifpt equals pt, there are no more than 
16
(n − t) bits flipped in the right mega sub-codeword with respect to position t. Therefore, as we will show, Bob can use a natural consistency decoder (defined below) to determine whether to stop or continue the decoding process. More precisely, the decoding process continues if the consistency decoder fails to return a message and stops if a messagem is decoded from the messages in L. The decoder also stops when t has reached size n − nθ.
∈ X n−t be two right mega sub-words with respect to position t. The right mega sub-word xt is consistent with the right mega sub-word x t if and only if the number of the positions that xt does not agree with x t is no more than centered at the right mega sub-codeword of each codeword corresponding to the messages in the list L. If the corresponding right mega sub-word of the received word is outside all the balls, increase t by nθ and goto Step (2) . If the received right mega sub-word lies in exactly one of the balls, decode to the message corresponding to the center of the ball. If the received right mega sub-word lies in more than one ball a decoding error is declared.
For every message m, Bob decodes correctly if his estimatê m equals m. That is, Bob decodes correctly if for some t , the only right mega sub-codeword of the codewords corresponding to messages in the list L consistent with that of the received word corresponds to the message m. We show that this indeed happens w.h.p. over the random secrets S n−t used by Alice for the right mega sub-codeword with respect to position t . If Bob's estimatem is not equal to m, Bob is said to make a decoding error. The probability of error for a message m is defined as the probability over Alice's private secrets s ∈ S that Bob decodes incorrectly. The probability of error for the code C is defined as the maximum of the probability of error for message m over all messages m ∈ U .
A rate R is said to be achievable if for every ξ > 0, β > 0 and every sufficiently large n there exists a code of block length n that allows Alice to communicate 2 n(R−β) distinct messages to Bob with probability of error at most ξ. The supremum over n of all achievable rates is the capacity Cp of the channel.
Adversarial behavior.
The behavior of Calvin is specified by the channel model above. Specifically, the behavior of Calvin can be characterized by a function pt defined below which specifies how many errors were ejected by Calvin up-to position t. We refer to pt as a trajectory, and note that the exact trajectory used by Calvin is not known to the decoder Bob.
Definition 2.5 (Calvin's Trajectory pt). Let a codeword of length n consist of 1 θ chunks of sub-codewords. Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n − nθ} and t ∈ T . Then pt is the actual portion of bit-flips that occurred in the left mega subcodeword with respect to t.
In our analysis we assume that Calvin has certain capabilities that may be beyond those available to a causal adversary. This is without loss of generality as we are studying lower bounds on the achievable rate in this work. We assume that the trajectory ofpt that Bob uses in his decoding process is known to Calvin. This implies (as we will show) that Calvin knows the position t that Bob eventually stops his decoding process. In addition, we assume that the list of messages obtained through Bob's list decoding process can be determined explicitly by Calvin. Moreover, we assume that Calvin knows the message m a priori.
At every list-decoding position t, we stress that the subsequent secrets, namely, (s Also, we strengthen Calvin by allowing him to choose which bits to flip after position t non-causally. Namely, we assume that Calvin chooses his bit-flip pattern after looking ahead to all the remaining bits of the transmitted codeword. As we show, no matter how these bit-flips are chosen, the right mega sub-codeword has at most 
16
(n − t ) bits flipped. The fact that the distribution of (s t nθ
+1
, · · · , s 1 θ ) is independent from the list L will allow us to show that Bob succeeds in his decoding.
CODE ANALYSIS (BIT-FLIP CHANNEL)
Due to space limitations, the technical details of our proof appear entirely in the extended version [5] . In what follows, we give a roadmap for our proof, including the major highlevel arguments used in the extended version. Throughout, > 0 is a constant design parameter that can be considered to be arbitrarily small and p is the fraction of bits the adversary can flip.
Existence of trajectorypt.
Recall that for each t, pt is the fraction of bit-flips in the left mega sub-codeword with respect to position t. Our analysis of Bob's decoding begins with selecting a decoding reference trajectorypt (Definition 3.1) as a "proxy" trajectory for Calvin's trajectory pt. Namely,pt is the fraction of bits that Bob assumes are flipped up to position t. 
For t < n(1 − 4(p + 2 /16)),pt = 0.
It is not hard to verify thatpt is monotone in t, and equals p slightly before t = n. To prove correctness of our decoding procedure, we must introduce a new trajectorypt and an additional parameter p before we continue. These additional parameters are closely related to their counterparts in the sense thatpt approximately equalspt and p approximately equals p , but in both cases the former is slightly smaller than the latter. The parameters are introduced to allow robustness in our analysis which absorbs certain slacknesses that are a result of our code construction and analysis technique (e.g., such as the fact that our chunk size nθ cannot be made too small). We here give our precise definitions, which can be at times better understood intuitively if the reader keeps the above discussion in mind.
In what follows let p = p + 2
16
and let
For t < n(1 − 4p ),pt = 0. In general, the trajectoriespt and pt are not necessarily equal. We show in Claim 3.2, that for t ≥ n(1 − 4p ) the selected decoding reference trajectorypt satisfies two important conditions, the list-decoding condition (6) and the energy bounding condition (7) introduced and explained previously. . Let
. Let a codeword of length n consist of 1 θ chunks of sub-codewords. Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n − nθ}. Then ∀t ≥ n(1 − 4p ) and t ∈ T ,pt satisfies
and
The list decoding condition (6) guarantees a small list size of size approximately O(1/ ) if decoding is done with radius tpt; and the energy bounding condition (7) restricts the remaining bit-flips that the adversary has for the right mega sub-codeword to slightly less than a fraction of 1/4 if Bob's estimatept to pt is approximately correct.
Existence of position t for whichpt pt .
Next in our analysis we choose the position
as a benchmarking position, and separate our analysis into two cases based on whether pt 0 is greater thanpt 0 or not. We use the following classification: . Then we havep (n−nθ) (n − nθ) ≥ np .
By Claim 3.4 we have thatp (n−nθ) ≥ p > p ≥ pn. As, in a High Type Trajectory, pt 0 ≥pt 0 we conclude that pt must intersect withpt at some intermediate point t.
Moreover, by Claim 3.5 and Claim 3.6 below, this implies a value t (the chunk end which falls immediately after the intersection point t above) for which it is guaranteed that the remaining bit-flip power of Calvin is low in the sense that the fraction of bit-flips that Calvin can introduce in the right mega sub-codeword with respect to t is less than 
. In words, roughly speaking, Claim 3.5 states that once pt intersectspt, pt is still abovept , which by Claim 3.6 implies that the remaining power of the adversary is limited. 
We now address a Low Type Trajectory of Calvin. In this case, we already know that pt is approximatelypt at the point t0 (they are both nearly 0). Thus we show in Claim 3.7 that setting t to be equal to t0 we are again guaranteed that the remaining bit-flip power of Calvin is low in the sense that the fraction of bit-flips that Calvin can introduce in the right mega sub-codeword with respect to t is less than 
Success of Bob's decoding.
Bob starts decoding at position t0 and continues to decode at subsequent chunk ends until a message is returned by the consistency decoder or until Bob reaches the end of the received word. Claim 3.8, that follows, guarantees (via the list decoding condition (6) ) that Bob in his first phase of decoding will always obtain a list of messages of list size L = O 1 from the list decoder no matter what position t is currently being considered. The analysis in Claim 3.8 and in the claims to come are w.h.p. over our random code construction. 
To analyze Bob's decoder we will need a few definitions. Roughly speaking, in the definitions and claim below, we will define when our code is "good" with respect to its right mega sub-code, and prove that it is indeed good with high probability over code design. 
from the list L(m).
The goodness of a right mega sub-code is what guarantees that the consistency check in the decoding process succeeds. Specifically, if a code is good with respect to a certain list and a certain message m; and in addition the right mega sub-codeword has few bit-flips; then if m is in the list it will be the unique element that passes the consistency checking phase of Bob, and if it is not in the list the consistency checking phase of Bob will not return any message.
In the claim that follows, we show that indeed with high probability over our code design a right mega sub-code
is good with respect to a specific message m, a specific list L(m), and a specific sequence of l = Claim 3.11 is very useful, however it does not suffice for our analysis if used naively. This is because of the fact that we need our code to be good with respect to every m and every list L(m) that the decoder Bob may encounter in the second phase of his decoding, and Claim 3.11 is not strong enough to be used naively in a union bound. We thus need to relax the Definition 3.10 to allow a higher probability of success. Towards this end, we use the randomness in Alice's stochastic encoding (not known a priori to Calvin) and the fact that Calvin is causal. Recall that every message m can be encoded into several codewords based on the randomness of Alice. Let s lef t and s right be the collection of Alice's random bits used up to and after position t respectively. When Calvin (perhaps partially) determines the list L we may assume that he has full knowledge of s lef t . However by his causal nature he has no knowledge regarding s right . As the list L is obtained at position t by Bob, we may now take advantage of the fact that it is independent of the randomness s right used by Alice. Specifically, instead of considering a single codeword in our analysis that corresponds to m we consider the family of codewords that on one hand all share a specific s lef t (which corresponds to Calvin's view up to position t) but have different s right . From Calvin's perspective at position t, all codewords in this family are equivalent and completely match his view so far. Using a family of codewords that are independent of L in our analysis, and allowing the decoding to fail on a small fraction of them, enables us to amplify the success rate of our decoding procedure to the extent that it can be used in the needed union bound. This amplification allows us to prove Claim 3.13 that follows. . With probability larger than 1 − 2 −n over code design, for every message m, every list L(m), and every chunk end t ∈ T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n − nθ}, the right mega sub-code is σ-good with respect to m and L(m).
We are now ready to summarize our analysis of Bob's decoder. We start by summarizing the properties of our code construction.
Claim 3.14. Let p ∈ 0, 1 4 and > 0. Let θ =
be the fraction of a codeword Calvin flips. With probability at least 1 − 1 n − 2 −n over code design, there exists a good code C such that the following properties are satisfied for every m:
• For any bit-flip pattern of the adversary, there exists a position t = k nθ such that for any position t = knθ for which t0 ≤ t ≤ t the left mega sub-code with respect to position t, C1 •C2 •· · ·•C k , is list decodable with radius tpt and list size L = O 1 . When t = t then the transmitted message m is in the list L. Let L(m) be the list of right mega sub-codewords corresponding to L \ {m}.
• For any position t = knθ for which t0 ≤ t ≤ t , the right mega sub-word received with respect to position t has no more than over code design. In addition, since t0pt 0 < t0pt 0 , we have m ∈ L. So far, the first property is satisfied for any Low Type Trajectory.
For the second set of properties, by Claim 3.7 the right mega sub-word with respect to position t0 has no more than over code design. Also, for t , since t pt < t pt , the transmitted message m is in the list L.
From Claim 3.5 and Claim 3.6, for any trajectory pt of Calvin of High Type, if t ≤ t then the right mega sub-word with respect to position t has no more than −n over code design. Thus, for any High Type Trajectory, the properties in the claim are also satisfied by our code design.
In conclusion, the probability that the code C possesses the properties stated is at least 1
Note that, using the code from Claim 3.14, the position t can found by Bob through an iterative decoding process starting from the position t0. Therefore, the coding process of Bob can stop at t correctly. More precisely, Claim 3.14 ensures that every time Bob obtains a list of codewords, then no matter if the transmitted message m is in the list L or not, the right mega sub-code with respect to position t ≤ t is σ-good with respect to m and the right mega subcodeword list L(m). In other words, if t is strictly smaller than t then the consistency decoding of Bob will not return any message, and when t = t the consistency decoding will return the correct message (all with high probability over the randomness of Alice). Thus, Bob can correctly determine whether to continue the decoding process or not. 
be the fraction of a codeword Calvin flips. Let R = C p − where
and α (p ,p) = 1 − 4(p −p). For any message m ∈ [2 nR ] and its corresponding encoding x ∈ {0, 1} n using the code established in Claim 3.14 and the encoder of Section 2, the decoding procedures described in Section 2 allows Bob to correctly decode the message m with probability at least 1 − n2 − nθ 3 32 over the random secrets S 1/θ available to Alice.
Proof. A decoding error occurs if in
Step (3) of the decoding procedure the consistency decoder fails to return a single message or if the decoder returns a message that is not equal to the transmitted message. For all t strictly less than t of Claim 3.14, we have by the properties of Claim 3.14 and by the definition of Step (3) of our decoding procedure that the consistency check in the decoding process will return the correct message or will not return any message (with probability 1 − σ over the randomness of the encoding). In addition, for t = t , with the same probability, the consistency check of the decoding process will return the correct message. In both cases, the success probability is obtained by the probability that the sequence of l secrets used in the right mega sub-codeword is not chosen from the particular σ portion of S l that may cause a decoding failure. From . Therefore, the probability of successful decoding is at least 
16
. The capacity of the binary causal adversary bit-flip channel Cp is
Proof. Let ξ > 0 and β > 0. The converse is proven in [9] . Namely, in [9] it is shown that for any code C (including codes with stochastic encoding) of rate R = Cp + β, the average error probability is lower bounded by β
The achievability proof (our main result) follows from the claim above. Specifically, for sufficiently large n it holds by Claim 3.15 that the decoding error is bounded above by ξ. In addition, for sufficiently small , by the definition of p and by the continuity of the entropy function, the code rate R = C p − of Claim 3.15 is at least Cp − β. Therefore, for sufficiently large n, 2 nR = 2 n(Cp−β) distinct messages can be reliably transmitted over our channel with error probability at most ξ. Hence, the channel capacity of the binary causal adversarial bit-flip channel is Cp.
Remark: The scenario wherein Calvin has n lookahead can also be handled via the codes above. Roughly, if we back off in our rate by the trajectorypt gets shifted to the left by n . We then "sacrifice" n bits to Calvin by demanding that a more stringent energy-bounding condition be satisfied, in which the block length of the second part (succeeding t ) is reduced by n . With these tweaks, the remainder of the analysis of the n -lookahead codes is identical to that of the causal codes discussed above.
Connections between upper and lower bounds on Cp.
In [8, 9] an attack strategy for a binary causal bit-flip jammer is presented and analyzed, resulting in an upper bound on the capacity. In particular, the adversarial jammer imposes errors by initially behaving like Bernoulli noise with parameterp for a period of time corresponding to nα (p,p), and then carefully "pushing" x towards a randomly chosen other "plausible" codeword x (a codeword that is consistent with Bob's view of the noisy transmissions up to time nα (p,p)) for the remainder. Here α (p,p) = 1 − 4(p −p). Specifically, in the initial Bernoulli noise phase of length nα (p,p) Calvin simultaneously injects just enough noisepn so as to ensure that Bob is unable to uniquely decode Alice's transmission. If Calvin choosesp and α (p,p) carefully (corresponding to the optimization overp in (1)), the essence of the upper bounding argument shown in [8, 9] is that with non-zero probability, a randomly chosen codeword x that differs in aboutpn locations in the first nα (p,p) bits yi seen by Bob (and hence is consistent with what Bob has seen thus far, and so is "plausible") has Hamming distance at most about 2(p −p)n in the remaining n − nα (p,p) locations from Alice's true transmission x. (This observation follows from a combination of the Plotkin bound, and an averaging argument.) This means that the aforementioned careful choices ofp and α (p,p) leave Calvin with enough of a bit-flip budget (p −p)n to successfully confuse Bob between x and x , by ensuring that the last n−nα (p,p) bits of Bob's observed bits have roughly equal Hamming distance (about (p −p)n) from the corresponding locations of x and x , both of which are plausible from Bob's perspective. This is what results in the expression corresponding to C f lip p , which may be viewed as an interpolation between the the capacity of a random bit-flip channel with flipping probability p (which equals 1−H(p)) and the Plotkin bound (which equals 1−4p).
In light of the decoding scheme considered in this paper, the initial "Bernoulli noise phase" is directly related to the list-decoding condition (6), and the "pushing" phase is directly related to the energy-bounding condition (7) . This suggests that a good decoder for capacity-achieving codes may correspond to using the trajectory corresponding to Calvin's attack outlined above as a reference trajectoryp (instead of thep we actually use in our analysis). This is because such a trajectoryp would correspond to an "optimal" attack strategy from Calvin's perspective, in the sense that it optimally trades off Calvin's attempt at delaying the time at which the list-decoding condition becomes active, while simultaneously preserving as much as possible of his bit-flip budget for the pushing phase.
Indeed, our first attempts in defining and analyzing a good decoding rule proceeded in this direction. However, the complex form of the expression in (1) means that analysis of the corresponding trajectory is quite tedious analytically. Luckily, we are able to make analysis simpler by instead considering a different reference trajectory -thep we actually use in our analysis. At first blush, this is surprising -in fact, thep we use is quite sub-optimal from an adversarial attack perspective. In particular, if Calvin were to indeed use this trajectory, and Bob knew this, then sincep equals zero until t is about (1 − 4p)n, Bob would be easily able to decode (as nR < (1 − 4p)n, Bob could essentially just decode from the first nR bits he receives). Further, since we are analyzing an achievability scheme, it is incumbent upon us to demonstrate that regardless of Calvin's actual trajectory (which is in general unknown to Alice and Bob), Bob should, with high probability, be able to decode Alice's transmission.
The key insight is this -as long as Bob's decoder is able to identify a point at which both the list-decoding condition and the energy bounding condition are satisfied, then our analysis indicates that he should be able to decode correctly w.h.p. The challenge for Bob then is to identify at least one such location at which both these conditions hold. The analysis we perform shows that any High Type Trajectory pt Calvin uses must intersect both the optimal attack trajectoryp and the reference trajectoryp we use (at potentially different times). Hence both offer proxies for Bob's decoder to use.
CONCLUSION
In this work we obtain the capacity C f lip p for the causal bit-flip adversarial channel and C erase p for the causal erasure adversarial channel. We believe that for arbitrary q > 2, capacities of the q-ary causal adversarial symbol error and erasure channels can be derived. Specifically, the outer bounds for the q-ary problems follow from using the q-ary Plotkin bound [4] replacing the binary Plotkin bound used in the outer bound techniques of [8] and [2] . The achievability strategies in this paper for q = 2 get modified by replacing binary list-decoding and energy-bounding conditions with qary versions, leading to codes with rates achieving the outer bounds mentioned above for the q-ary problems. In fact, techniques similar to those in this work can also plausibly be used to derive capacity regions for causal channels in which the adversary can both flip up to a p f -fraction of bits, and erasure up to a pe-fraction of of bits, thereby combining the two adversarial models in this work into a single model. These ideas are the subject of ongoing investigation. Given the significant difference between the capacities of causal adversaries (characterized in this work) and the n -delayed adversaries considered in [7] (with capacities equaling the corresponding random coding capacities), one open question that we do not address in this work is the question of characterizing the capacity of an adversary that is "nearly" causal, i.e., a delay of say some constant number of bits, or even just one bit. Another promising direction for future research is whether the techniques of [11] to construct computationally efficient capacity-achieving codes for oblivious adversaries can be modified to construct corresponding capacity-achieving codes for causal adversaries.
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